Will Little Havana Go Blue?
It used to be enough for politicians to fly in from
Washington, talk tough about Castro and count on the
support of Cuban Miami. Things are different now.
Republicans have counted on the Cuban-American vote for
decades, but the Cuban exile community of South Florida
is changing, just in time for the election.
By DAVID RIEFF
On the surface, political life in Cuban Miami seems
unchanged. Little Havana is still partly a Disney
version of a displaced Cuba and partly a genuine
community hub, where families who have long since left
for suburbia still come for nostalgic weekend lunches.
At the Versailles Restaurant, the community newspapers
preaching no compromise with Castro are all that are on
offer. For almost four decades, the Versailles has been
an obligatory stop for Washington politicians courting
the Cuban-American community, visits that, as
photographs in the restaurant attest, have often
involved putting on a white guayabera, the four-pocket
dress shirt that often replaces a coat and tie in the
Caribbean. This familiar theater of intransigence a
staple of South Florida life at least since the Bay of
Pigs invasion in 1961, when C.I.A.-backed Cuban exiles
tried to overthrow the new Communist regime is
ubiquitous. Some Cuban-Americans point hopefully to a
softening in the Spanish-language, Cuba-focused radio
outlets that now dominate the South Florida market. But
for an outsider, what is striking is the degree to which
the hard-line stance endures, since it might have been
supposed that 50 years of failure to influence events on
the island might have led to the conclusion that the
hard-line position needed to be reconsidered. Most
officeholders in Florida and, for that matter, most
national politicians continue to at least pay lip
service to the dream of a post-Communist Cuba, even
though, early this year, Fidel Castro succeeded in
seamlessly handing over power to his brother Raúl
testimony, if any was needed, to the stability of the
regime.
Yet if Cuban Miami does indeed continue to dream, it is
also beginning, quietly, tentatively and painfully, to
adjust. Backstage, something very new is happening. Call
it the Miami Spring, or Cuban-American glasnost. This
community that has clung for decades to its certainties
about the island itself, about the role the exile
community would play after the Castro brothers passed
from the scene, about where Cuban-Americans should
situate themselves in terms of U.S. domestic politics
is in ferment. This matters not only in terms of the
destiny of the Cuban-American community itself but also
in terms of the 2008 elections since, despite claims
made on background by some of Barack Obama’s advisers,
Florida is likely to play a pivotal role in determining
whether Obama or John McCain becomes president, and the
Cuban-American vote is likely to play its usual outsize
role in deciding which candidate prevails in the state.
In the past, both Democratic and Republican contenders
tried to conform to the hard-line expectations they
perceived as the overwhelming consensus within the
Cuban-American community. But Obama has recently strayed
from orthodoxy by criticizing aspects of the American
embargo on Cuba and asserting that he is prepared to
open talks with the regime. This might seem like a
golden opportunity for McCain to solidify his hold on
the Cuban-American vote, but Obama’s views appear to be
resonating in Cuban Miami more than anyone could have
predicted. Two Democratic Congressional candidates in
the Miami area Joe Garcia and Raul Martinez were
added last month to the Democratic Congressional
Campaign Committee’s list of potential “red to blue”
conversions, bringing to 37 the number of seats
nationally that the Democrats hope to flip away from the
Republicans. For the first time, the hard-line consensus
is being challenged. There is real debate in Cuban Miami
these days about the embargo, above all about the series
of further restrictions that were imposed by the Bush
administration in 2003 and 2004. These limited travel
for so-called people-to-people educational exchanges,
abolished the category of “fully hosted” travel (under
which travel to and from Cuba was underwritten by non-U.S.
citizens and which Washington long suspected of being a
scheme for money-laundering), reduced family visits to
once every three years and limited the sending of money
from Cubans or Cuban-Americans living in the United
States to the sender’s immediate family parents,
siblings, children rather than, as before, to his or
her extended family. A decade ago, support for such
restrictions and any other confrontational policy was a
certainty in Cuban South Florida. So was its domestic
corollary: dependable support for Republicans both
locally and nationally. Today, and quite suddenly, that
unwavering support for Republicans is no longer a given.
Even sudden change has roots, and this is true in South
Florida. Eduardo Padrón, the president of Miami Dade
College and himself a Democrat, told me recently: “This
community was always a great deal more politically
diverse than it was given credit for. And Cubans have
always been more socially liberal than their voting
patterns might suggest.” The architect Raúl Rodríguez
whom I accompanied on a number of family visits to the
island in the early 1990s and who has been involved in
civic affairs in South Florida for many years put it
more sharply: “This community has always been
caricatured.”
The community is also more fluid than you might assume.
Despite Republican dominance ever since President John
F. Kennedy was seen as having betrayed the cause
following the Bay of Pigs disaster, Cuban-American
Democrats have been able to gain office from time to
time. César Odio was Miami’s (appointed) city manager;
Alex Penelas was mayor of Miami-Dade County during the
Elián González controversy, in which, over fierce (and
bipartisan) protests in Miami, the Clinton
administration returned to Cuba a child whose father
remained on the island and whose mother tried to take
him with her to Florida in a makeshift raft but drowned
on the voyage. But while Odio and Penelas were
impeccably liberal on domestic issues, their attitudes
toward the Castro regime were every bit as
confrontational as those of their Republican rivals.
Penelas took a leading role supporting those trying to
keep Elián in Miami, while Odio was a key political
adviser to Jorge Mas Canosa. Mas Canosa’s political
action committee, the Cuban American National Foundation
(CANF), had a reach in Washington in the 1980s and 1990s
almost on a par with those of the American Association
of Retired Persons or the American Israel Public Affairs
Committee.
Until Mas Canosa’s death in 1997, “the Foundation,” as
it is almost universally referred to in Miami, could
legitimately be described as the power in the exile
community, and Mas Canosa it was always difficult to
separate the man from the institution was the person
to whom both Republican and Democratic administrations
turned for the seal of approval on all matters related
to Cuba policy. But there is little question that while
he supported some Democrats and could work with them on
local problems, on the national level, Mas Canosa, like
his constituency, was strongly Republican. The speaker
of the Florida House of Representatives, Marco Rubio, is
a Republican, as are all three of greater Miami’s
Congressional representatives Ileana Ros-Lehtinen,
Lincoln Diaz-Balart and his brother, Mario Diaz-Balart
and one of Florida’s two senators, Mel Martinez. And
only the most optimistic Democratic political operative
would go so far as to claim that Cuban South Florida is
likely to eschew John McCain for Barack Obama, any more
than it opted for John Kerry or Al Gore over George W.
Bush. Senator McCain almost certainly represented the
majority view in Cuban Miami when he insisted, in a
speech there in May, that to soften the travel
restrictions or the limits on remittances “would send
the worst possible signal to Cuba’s dictators there is
no need to undertake fundamental reforms; they can
simply wait for a unilateral change in U.S. policy.”
But the fact that the Illinois senator would decide to
take the bull by the horns and come out flatly for a
less absolutist interpretation of Washington’s embargo
in a speech before a Cuban-American audience in Miami
and be received warmly at the foundation by Jorge Mas
Canosa’s son is an emblem of the fact that the
Cuban-American vote is in play even on what in exile
politics is called el tema: the theme of the exile and
of Cuba’s future. As Obama put it at the luncheon for
him at the foundation: “I know what an easy thing it is
to do for American politicians. Every four years, they
come down to Miami, they talk tough, they go back to
Washington and nothing changes in Cuba.” In a direct
appeal to Cuban-American voters opposed to the
restrictions on travel and remittances, the senator said
it was “time to let Cuban-American money make their
families less dependent upon the Castro regime.”
Whether Obama really expected to make inroads into the
Cuban-American vote with the speech is questionable.
When Hillary Clinton was still in the race, she was far
more circumspect, even if, off the record, her aides
expressed views not that dissimilar from those of the
liberal Cuban-Americans whom Obama was echoing. But that
the presumptive Democratic nominee would think the
speech worth making at all, in a community where he is
the subject of a great deal of mistrust and hostility
and in a state where he is not polling well against
Senator McCain, exemplifies the change that is taking
place in the Cuban-American community.
The most significant emblems of this new dispensation in
Miami, however, are closer to home. It had long been a
commonplace of South Florida politics that greater
Miami’s three Congressional representatives,
Ros-Lehtinen and the Diaz-Balart brothers who are
descended from a prominent pre-Castro political family
could basically keep their seats for life, as previous
South Florida congressmen like Claude Pepper and Dante
Fascell did. But while Ros-Lehtinen is generally
regarded as a shoo-in for re-election, the Diaz-Balart
brothers are facing the first serious challenges of
their careers. Instead of facing off against the
comparative unknowns who have been the sacrificial lambs
of the Democratic Party in the past in and around Miami,
they are facing two extremely well-known (and
surprisingly well-financed) Cuban-American Democrats:
Raul Martinez, the controversial former mayor of the
working-class (and overwhelmingly Cuban-American) city
of Hialeah, just northwest of Miami, and a proven
vote-getter for many years; and Joe Garcia, from his
youth a protégé and then a trusted colleague of Jorge
Mas Canosa’s and, after the older man’s death, his
successor as head of the Cuban American National
Foundation.
It is a stunning change. As recently as 2004, the
Diaz-Balart brothers each won re-election easily. And
while in the Democratic tsunami of 2006 their Democratic
challengers did somewhat better than expected, no one
really thought that genuinely credible opponents like
Martinez and Garcia might decide to take on the brothers
in 2008. Some people in Cuban Miami say privately that
overconfidence led both congressmen to neglect
bread-and-butter issues in their districts and not
devote enough resources to constituent services. They
point out that the third Cuban-American member of the
House delegation, Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, has
constituent services second to none and is far more
flexible on social questions than the Diaz-Balarts. (Her
district now includes the heavily gay Florida Keys, and
she has garnered considerable support there as well.)
This, they say, rather than her views about Cuba, is
what makes her own re-election such a virtual certainty.
The problem for the Diaz-Balart brothers is that this
time they are facing competitors whose Cuban bona fides
are beyond challenge, and who are more in tune with the
social liberalism of much of the Cuban-American
community. As Joe Garcia put it to me over coffee at the
Versailles Restaurant in Little Havana, “Mario is not
going to out-Cuban me, that’s one thing you and he
can count on.” (Mario Diaz-Balart declined to be
interviewed for an article in what his press spokesman
described as the “left-wing New York Times,” asserting
that it could not be objective; Lincoln Diaz-Balart
simply did not respond to interview requests.) For his
part, Raul Martinez points to intimidation of dissident
voices in the past. “There is a fear in this community,”
he said as we sat together in the living room of his
home in Hialeah, “that if you speak out, then bad things
will happen. I think that, in particular, businesspeople
have been afraid of being denounced on talk radio or not
getting contracts because they are too ‘controversial.’
” This has now changed, he said, and the change is real,
though he added, laughing, “It’s just that no one wanted
to be the first person to call for it.”
Raul Martinez says he believes that Lincoln Diaz-Balart
and his supporters will focus on the Cuba issue to the
virtual exclusion of all others. “They have no other
issues to discuss,” he said. “They have to attack me as
objectively pro-Castro.” Referring to the Miami gossip
that Lincoln Diaz-Balart retains political ambitions in
Cuba after the fall of the regime, Martinez added: “I
don’t want to be president of Cuba. When change comes to
the island, I want to be a resource person.”
Martinez was scathing about Lincoln Diaz-Balart’s record
on constituent service. It seemed clear that as far as
he was concerned, the priority should always have been
what you could bring back to your district. “Claude
Pepper,” he said, “who held this seat for decades,
brought back federal money for affordable housing.
Lincoln was in Congress when I was mayor of Hialeah. He
never brought any bacon home. What I got, I got from
other congressmen. What has Lincoln done? As we say in
Cuba, he has one song, and he’s sticking to it. I want
to do what Pepper did, what Dante Fascell did.” But to
achieve this, Martinez conceded, meant challenging the
way political dialogue has been structured in the
Cuban-American community for decades. He said he sensed
it was happening. “Where people used to worry about
being called Communists,” he told me, “and that was
something that ended the conversation in Miami, now
times have changed. What people say to me is not, ‘How
can you dare take these positions,’ but, ‘What took you
so long?’ ”
This does not mean that Cuban-American voters have
become so assimilated into the American mainstream that
they will vote pocketbook issues to the exclusion of
Cuba-centered ones like the terms of the embargo or the
role of the exile community. Both the painful wounds of
exile and concern about the future of the island,
rekindled now that Raúl Castro has settled into power,
are never far from the surface in Cuban Miami, even
among young people whose politics vis-à-vis Cuba are far
less hard-line and confrontational than those of their
parents and grandparents. “Everyone in Miami has been
waiting to say that the exile is over,” Raúl Rodríguez
told me. “But as Yogi Berra said, ‘It ain’t over ’til
it’s over.’ ”
Just as the struggle between the exiles and the Castro
regime was always a civil war in the most basic sense,
pitting family member against family member, so the
political schism in Miami is a family and often a
generational affair. One of Joe Garcia’s young staff
members, an Obama supporter, Giancarlo Sopo, exemplifies
this. His biography is typical of leading families
within the exile community. And if Sopo cannot be called
representative, he is nonetheless one of a great many of
the children and grandchildren of hard-line anti-Castro
exiles to have come to believe that not only do things
have to change in Cuba, but they have to change in Miami
as well.
Over lunch in Miami Beach, Sopo was at pains to point
out both what unites and what divides the generations.
“My father was a Bay of Pigs veteran,” he told me. “He
was in one of the first infiltration teams to go into
Cuba before the landing. Later, he was Jorge Mas’s
right-hand man at the foundation, a Ronald Reagan
supporter to his core.” Sopo’s face hardened and his
voice grew quieter: “My father died in 1999. He died
frustrated because his dreams of returning to Cuba never
came true. But I don’t believe my father died so that my
generation could make the same mistakes. There has to be
another way.”
For some in the older generation of Cuban exiles, Sopo’s
“other way” is inevitable with the passage of time. As
another former foundation stalwart, César Odio, observed
grimly, “The exile will be over by death, with my
generation dying out.” For Odio, young people like Sopo
and Odio’s own younger son, who is also working for
Obama, are typical of what in Miami is often referred to
as the fourth generation (though Odio’s wife, Marian
Prio, the daughter of a former president of Cuba, has
been a strong backer of the Illinois senator from early
in the campaign). “If things haven’t changed yet,” he
told me, “they will soon enough. Not only are the
historical exiles going away, but increasingly the
community is either made up of people who consider
themselves to be Americans first or, among the recent
arrivals, people who grew up in Castro’s Cuba for whom
the embargo as currently enforced simply makes no human
sense. They, not the intransigents, are the majority
now.”
Odio is certainly not alone in emphasizing the effect on
South Florida politics of Cubans who have arrived since
the early 1980s. Attitudes have been mutating for many
years, particularly among people who have arrived from
the island over the past decade and among the generation
of young, native-born Cuban-Americans in college or now
entering the work force, for whom Cuba is less a cause
than a curiosity and, potentially at least, a business
opportunity.
Both Joe Garcia and Raul Martinez are betting on these
recent arrivals to help undermine the hard-liners. For
many of the newcomers, Cuba is a place, not a cause; and
to the extent they have a cause, it is the relatives
they left behind not all that long ago and want to see
regularly and help without restriction. Martinez flatly
dismissed the idea that the ban on remittances was
effective anyway. “If you go to a local barber,” he told
me by way of illustration, “and people are reassured
that you’re not from the F.B.I., they are likely to ask
you how, not whether, they can send money to their
relatives in Cuba. Everybody down here is doing it!”
Such rhetoric is part of Martinez’s argument for why
voters should choose him over Lincoln Diaz-Balart. But
when he talks about voters asking him indignantly, “The
government’s going to tell me I can’t go see my family
more than once every three years or send them money?”
or insists that anti-Castro intransigence has become “a
business” for a Cuban-American establishment unwilling
“to lose its franchise” he is identifying a hunger for
change that he maintains is widespread within the
community.
Martinez’s fellow insurgent candidate, Joe Garcia, is
convinced that the times have changed already. He does
not repudiate the anti-Castro activism of Mas Canosa.
Indeed, in conversation he speaks proudly both of Mas
Canosa and of his own connection to him. But he claims
that his own message of change is getting a hearing even
among older, more hard-line voters. “Many of them,” he
told me, “know just as well as I do that new times
demand new solutions. I can speak with authority about
the ways we tried in the past. I played a role in
shaping them, after all. But I think if Jorge Mas were
alive today, he would see that the world has changed and
that we Cuban exiles, and Cuban-Americans, we have to
change, too.”
When I told César Odio what Garcia had said, he smiled,
though whether more out of amusement or bitterness was
hard to say. “Look,” he told me flatly, “we tried
intransigence, and it got us nothing in terms of
actually affecting what took place on the island for all
those years. It will be half a century next year since
Castro seized power! Do you realize that? And when
Castro turned over power to his brother, what effect did
we in the exile have? The answer, unfortunately, is none
whatsoever.” After a pause, he added, “And even if
someone could promise us that we would be more effective
at some point in the future, he has to face the fact
that the commitments of people of my generation people
born in Cuba are not the same as those of our children
and grandchildren.” Anyone who spends much time with
young Cuban-Americans in South Florida can vouch for the
accuracy of this. As Odio put it, “The fourth generation
of Cuban-Americans, born here of people born here, are
not exiles; they’re Americans. Cuba is important to
them, but it’s not everything to them, the way it is
still to this day to many people in my generation.”
Whether this means a change in the monopoly on power
that hard-line Cuban-Americans have maintained pretty
much since they began to gain serious political power in
the 1970s is another question. On the two key questions
whether pocketbook concerns will trump exile politics
in the 2008 election cycle, and whether there is now
enough opposition to the ban on remittances and the
limitations on travel the jury is still out, and will
be until the fall elections decide the matter. After
all, Democrats have won in Miami-Dade County (that is,
greater Miami) before. John Kerry carried the city in
2004. But no one suggests that he did so with
Cuban-American votes or that his victory represented any
great shift in the community’s attitudes. Even if the
Democratic victories are as widespread in November as
the consensus among political consultants and pundits
suggests, the electoral math may still not add up for
Cuban-American Democrats. Modesto Maidique, president of
Florida International University, argues that John
McCain will be a powerful candidate both in Cuban South
Florida and in the state generally, and he is almost
certainly correct. And the Democratic consultants and
campaign workers I spoke with struck me as taking their
wishes for reality when they suggested that McCain won’t
have coattails. As the influential State Representative
David Rivera, admittedly himself an interested party on
the Republican side of the political divide, put it to
me: “I concede that if you poll people who have come
here from Cuba over the past decade, they feel
differently than the 1959 or even the Mariel generation.
But I think the people who say they represent a
fundamental shift are deluding themselves.”
Yet even Rivera conceded that the hard-line voting bloc
is aging. His conviction that the 2008 cycle would
comfortably return Mario and Lincoln Diaz-Balart to
Congress and help put Florida’s electoral votes in John
McCain’s column was, in part at least, based on his
belief that “it’s older people who vote.” As he told me,
“We call them supervoters, and they are overwhelmingly
hard-line anti-Castro and pro-democracy.” Of the Mariel
generation between that of the revolutionary-era
exiles and the most recent generations, and named for
the harbor from which as many as 125,000 people left
Cuba for the U.S. in 1980 Rivera said it was
predominantly, if not monolithically, “anti-Castro,
pro-democracy, anti-Communist.”
Regarding the 300,000 or more people who have come from
Cuba to the United States in the past 10 years, Rivera
presented a subtle picture. “Anecdotally,” he told me,
“it’s not that the post-1994 generation is pro-Castro,
but instead that they think politics ruined their lives
in Cuba, and so they are deeply apolitical. Whatever my
Democratic friends may be telling themselves, whatever
Raul [Martinez] and Joe [Garcia] may be hoping, they’re
not ready to be energized politically.” There is little
doubt that antipolitics is the strongest form of
politics among these recent arrivals. Unlike earlier
generations of exiles, most are not mourning the
non-Communist Cuba that was and might have been. For
them, Communism is a fact of life from childhood, not
something alien however much most may detest the
regime and be glad to have made their way to the U.S.
And while most would probably say they value the
freedoms of the United States, there is little doubt
that many, if not most, left for economic and family
reasons.
How this translates into American politics is another
question. When I asked Rivera if he thought that, in the
long run, this generation would not alter the political
terms of reference in the Cuban-American community, his
answer was curiously ambiguous and seemed more like a
statement of faith than the conclusion of a hardheaded,
savvy modern American politician. “By the time you have
critical mass,” he said musingly, “with an ability to
make a difference, we may all be back in Cuba.”
Marco Rubio, speaker of the Florida Legislature and
Rivera’s colleague, friend and political ally both men
supported Mike Huckabee in the Republican primaries,
then endorsed John McCain and are working hard for him
throughout South Florida was at pains to emphasize his
sympathy for anyone who wanted to send money to their
relatives on the island. Like Rivera, Rubio readily
conceded that people who have arrived in Miami from Cuba
in the past 5 to 10 years did harbor different
attitudes. “It would be disingenuous of me to pretend
otherwise,” he told me. But Rubio thoughtfully defended
the 2004 restrictions on both practical and ethical
grounds. “Let me give you some context,” he told me,
“the kind of context I don’t hear when I listen to Joe
or Raul and incidentally, Raul has been a career
politician for 30 years, and Joe has been politically
active for years, so I don’t really see how they can
call themselves new faces on the South Florida scene.”
Having made his point, Rubio returned to the context of
the embargo: “First of all, in 2004, we had realized
that unrestricted remittances had become a cash cow for
the Castro regime. As for the travel limitations, I
would never criticize anyone for visiting family
members. But that wasn’t the problem. What you had was a
situation where people would come to Miami from Cuba,
stay for a year and a day and then go back. And what
this was doing was threatening the sustainability of the
Cuban Adjustment Act itself, the U.S. law that gives
Cubans who come to this country a special status as
political exiles rather than immigrants.
“What makes Cubans different from Haitians who come here
or anyone else,” Rubio went on, “if they go back and
forth, that is to say, if they’re not exiles at all? In
that case, why should Cubans be any different? The whole
structure would have unraveled had something not been
done.”
Rubio was saying that neither Washington nor the
Cuban-exile community could accept a
historical-political exile morphing into a contemporary
economic migration. It was an argument that I was
surprised not to have heard more often from supporters
of the Diaz-Balarts and other politicians on the
Republican side: that the embargo was necessary to
preserve the status of Cubans in America as political
exiles. At the least, the recent intensification of the
debate within the Cuban-American community has caused
people like Rubio to defend positions that initially
seem more like role reversal than political orthodoxy.
Thus, supporters of a loosening of the embargo spoke
about the emancipatory effects of tourism and big
business while a conservative like Rubio justified the
embargo at least in part because, as he put it,
“otherwise American businesses will just go to Cuba and
prefer to do business with the government. Corporations
are not interested in democracy; they’re interested in
making money, in capitalism. Look at China. There
businesses don’t have to abide by environmental
standards, union rights, human rights generally.” It is
a peculiar world when the conservative hard-liners fear
the results of a free market and the left-leaning
reformers want to give capitalism a chance.
Whether Joe Garcia and Raul Martinez win their bet, or
instead, the Diaz-Balarts manage to win in what will
almost certainly be a very bad cycle for Congressional
Republicans, the change in Cuban Miami is palpable. Even
the rhetoric of Washington politicians campaigning in
South Florida seems to have grown more nuanced, as if
these politicians and their staffs know that even David
Rivera’s hard-line “supervoters” are no longer as likely
to be appeased by symbolism as they often were in the
past. After Senator Obama’s speech produced little
outcry with only a few diehards accusing him and the
foundation, which hosted him, of being Communists or the
dupes of Communists Raúl Rodríguez said to me that
what he and many people he knew were most grateful for
was that, so far, neither John McCain nor Barack Obama
“put on a guayabera or shouted, ‘Viva Cuba libre.’ It
may have taken 50 years, but that at least is no longer
acceptable.”
David Rieff, a contributing writer for the magazine,
is the author, most recently, of “Swimming in a Sea of
Death: A Son’s Memoir.” His book “The Exile: Cuba in the
Heart of Miami” was published in 1993. |